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Inactivated severe acute respiratory syndrome–asso-
ciated coronavirus samples were used for an external qual-
ity assurance study within the World Health Organization
SARS Reference and Verification Network and other refer-
ence institutions. Of 58 participants, 51 correctly detected
virus in all samples >9,400 RNA copies per milliliter and
none in negative samples. Commercial test kits significant-
ly improved the outcome. 
S
evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is an infec-
tious interstitial pneumonia that causes death in a con-
siderable portion of patients. The first epidemic of SARS
began in November 2002 in southern China, spread to all
five continents, and was interrupted in July 2003. It caused
774 deaths among the 8,098 cases. Two laboratory-associ-
ated infections and four new isolated cases have since
occurred (1). SARS is caused by a novel coronavirus
(SARS-CoV) that is shed in patients’respiratory secretions
after infection (2–5). Immune response to SARS-CoV
appears with a latency of up to 4 weeks from infection, and
the concentration of virus particles varies greatly between
patients or types of clinical samples. Thus achieving a reli-
able virologic diagnosis early after disease onset is diffi-
cult. Highly sensitive methods for virus detection, such as
reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)
are required to confirm SARS in the acute phase and pre-
vent transmission. 
Molecular detection methods have been developed by
several research laboratories, and the first commercial test
kits have become available (6,7). The performance of such
tests, however, has only been evaluated in pilot feasibility
studies. Little data exist about the relative performance of
different laboratories and methods. The World Health
Organization (WHO) has made the comparing and stan-
dardizing of laboratory tests an issue of high priority in
SARS research (8). Comparative testing of characterized
samples is a direct way to identify weaknesses of single
laboratories or certain methods.
The Study
We present the results of the first external quality assur-
ance study on SARS-CoV molecular detection. Ninety-
three institutions involved in laboratory diagnostics of
SARS were invited to participate in the study. Invitees
were members of the international WHO SARS Reference
and Verification Laboratory Network (9) or national and
regional SARS reference laboratories. The study was
announced as an external quality assurance study on diag-
nostic proficiency, which included certifying and publish-
ing the results in a comparative and anonymous manner.
Fifty-eight laboratories from 38 countries (21 European, 9
Austral-Asian, 7 North and South American, and 1
African) eventually enrolled in the study.1 Four companies
that produced commercial diagnostic test systems also par-
ticipated but were evaluated separately because they do not
fulfill public health duties. 
Virus material was obtained from supernatants of Vero
cell cultures collected one day after infection with SARS-
CoV strains Frankfurt 1 and HKU-1. The supernatants
were heated to 56°C for 1 h and γ irradiated with 30 kGy.
Residual infectivity was excluded by Vero cell cultures
(3 passages). Aliquots of the inactivated virus stock solu-
tions were lyophilized and redissolved, and the virus RNA
was quantified by two different noncommercial real-time
RT-PCR assays (2,6). Virion integrity was confirmed by
morphology by electron microscopy (data not shown). Test
samples for the study were generated by diluting the inac-
tivated virus stock solutions in human fresh-frozen plasma
testing negative for HIV-1, hepatitis B virus, hepatitis C
virus, and SARS-CoV by RT-PCR. Aliquots of 100 µL
each were then lyophilized and shipped at ambient temper-
ature to the participating laboratories. Each participant
received a coded panel of seven positive and three negative
samples. Virus-positive samples contained 94–940,000
RNA copies per milliliter after resuspending in 100 µLo f
water. The participants were asked to analyze the material
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Health, Oslo, Norway.with the molecular methods they routinely use in suspect-
ed cases in humans. Details about the methods were
requested, such as the sources of RT-PCR primers and pro-
tocols, the type of extraction method used, and suppliers
and types of commercial kits, if used. The following two
criteria were chosen as minimum requirements for overall
proficiency. First, laboratories had to correctly detect the
four samples containing >9,400 copies of viral RNA per
milliliter, a concentration well above the detection limit of
published and commercial nucleic acid amplification tests
(NAT) for SARS-CoV, (6,7,10–12). Second, no false-pos-
itive results were allowed with the negative samples.
Indeterminate results in positive samples were treated as
negative and in negative samples were treated as positive
since the application of NAT usually does not involve
indeterminate endpoints, and laboratories should be able to
resolve unclear results by double testing with another
amplification assay (13). 
Before evaluating the performance of individual labo-
ratories, we determined how many participants managed to
detect virus in each sample (Table 1). The concentration-
dependent, cumulative positivity rates per sample corre-
sponded exactly with the response rates calculated by a
probit regression analysis, which is equivalent to a dose-
response model (Figure, p < 0.0001). The model could pre-
dict for the average laboratory that 50% of all test results
could be expected to be correctly positive when 158 (95%
confidence interval [CI] 76.55–269.15) copies of virus
RNA per milliliter of sample were present, and 95% with
more than 11,220 (95% CI 5,675–31,988) copies per mil-
liliter. Good compliance with the model furthermore con-
firmed that all samples contained the expected
concentration of RNA upon reception by the participants
and that no RNA degradation had occurred even in sam-
ples containing low amounts of virus.
Applying the proficiency criteria, 51 (88%) of 58 labo-
ratories passed the minimum requirements for successful
participation. Failure in three laboratories was due to lack
of sensitivity, in three due to false-positive results, and in
one due to both. Thirteen of 51 successful laboratories
(22.4% of all 58 participants) could also detect the virus in
all three weakly positive samples (<2,350 copies/mL), and
another 17 missed only one positive sample. Ten of the 58
laboratories issued indeterminate results in one or more
samples.
Whether common technical factors would influence the
performance of laboratories was also assessed. We subject-
ed cumulative results from low concentration samples
(<2,300 copies/mL) to analysis of variance (ANOVA)
analysis. The overall positivity rate in these samples was
65.6% (95% CI 56.1%–75.0%). Seven technical factors
(Table 2) were used to characterize the test procedures
each laboratory was using. Only use of commercial RT-
PCR test kits made a significant difference with regard to
total sensitivity. This finding was in concordance with
results of the four participating companies who manufac-
ture these kits: all were 100% correct. Fourteen of 58 par-
ticipants used commercial test kits. For noncommercial
tests, whether laboratories developed primers themselves
or adapted from other researchers did not make a differ-
ence. This finding might be due to availability of well-
evaluated primers through a WHO internet resource during
the outbreak (14). Forty-two of the 58 participants used at
least one procedure listed on this site. 
We finally assessed whether laboratories belonging to
the international WHO SARS Reference and Verification
Network (9) were more proficient in SARS molecular
detection than others. In the three samples containing
<2,350 copies of SARS-CoV RNA per milliliter, the
network laboratories achieved a cumulative fraction of
correct positive results of 79.5% (95% CI 60.2%–98.9%)
as opposed to 61.5% (95% CI 50.6%–72.4%) in the other
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Figure. Probit analysis of the fractions of laboratories achieving a
positive result (y-axis) in relation to the virus RNA concentration in
a given positive sample (x-axis). Data points represent individual
samples in proficiency test panel. The thick line is the regression
line calculated on the basis of a probit model (dose-response
curve); the thin lines are 95% confidence intervals. Data fit into the
model with p < 0.0001.labs participating in the study. This difference was not sig-
nificant (p value = 0.11, t-test). 
Conclusions
The results of this first external quality assurance study
on SARS-CoV molecular detection are assuring.
Compared to an earlier study on molecular testing for
filoviruses, Lassa virus, and orthopoxviruses, using very
similar proficiency criteria (15), almost double the portion
of participating laboratories completed the study success-
fully (88% vs. 45.8%). On the other hand, this study only
examined paramount issues like sensitivity and control of
contamination. Validation of other aspects, like cross-reac-
tivity of primers or control of PCR inhibition, is the
responsibility of each diagnostic laboratory. 
Commercial tests clearly were the preferred way of
achieving good diagnostic performance, possibly because
SARS-CoV is a pathogen with which relatively few labo-
ratories have had experience. However, developing and
approving commercial tests is a lengthy process and high
costs limit their application. Other approaches have to be
adopted for efficiently providing good diagnostic tools in
immediate response to an infectious disease outbreak.
WHO’s strategy of disseminating essential information
through a public Internet resource before publication has
proven successful. Laboratories have willingly shared pro-
tocols and positive control material with other institutions,
enabling qualified diagnostics within weeks after the pri-
mary description of the new virus. The benefit is proven by
good overall results in this study. 
International strain collections should be complement-
ed with noninfectious reference material of rare pathogens.
Until now, such material has been available only for high-
ly prevalent agents like HIV-1, herpes viruses, or hepatitis
viruses. For SARS-CoV, reference material has been creat-
ed in this study for the first time. All samples described can
be obtained for a nonprofit charge through the WHO
SARS Reference and Verification Laboratory Network. 
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